

Message Text

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INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: WG PAPER ON AERIAL INSPECTION

REF: A. USNATO 4086; B. USNATO 4204; C) STATE 177452

1. WE TRANSMIT BELOW A NEW DRAFT
OF REF A PAPER, WHICH STAFF GROUP REVISED FOLLOWING SEPTEMBER
24 WG DISCUSSION. AT THAT MEETING, WG ACCEPTED UK AMENDMENTS
(REF B) AS MODIFIED BY U.S. (REF C). SHAPE, NETHERLANDS,
AND FRG REPS PROPOSED CHANGES LISTED PARA 3 BELOW. CITING PARA
9 OF ANNEX C TO PAPER, FRG REP (DZIALAS) ASKED SHAPE REP FOR STATEMENT

ON ANY CONCLUSIONS SHAPE HAS DRAWN ON CONSEQUENCES OF FOUR
POWER AGREEMENT IF ADVERSARY INSPECTION WERE PERMITTED. ACTING
CHAIRMAN (SMITH) AND IS REP (GUSSMAN) SAID WG WAS NOT RIGHT
FORUM FOR THIS QUESTION. DZIALAS DID NOT PURSUE ISSUE.

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2. ACTION REQUESTED: WASHINGTON COMMENTS AND AUTHORIZATION TO
ACCEPT NEW DRAFT, BY OCTOBER 15.

3. NEW DRAFT INCLUDES UK PROPOSALS (REF B) AS MODIFIED BY

U.S. (REF C) AND FOLOWING CHANGES SUGGESTED SEPTEMBER 24 (PARA NUMBERS, EXCEPT AS NOTED FOR PARA 12, ARE SAME IN REF A AND NEW DRAFT):

- A. PARA 2 (C): IN FIRST SENTENCE REPLACE PHRASE "RECOMMENDS LIMITATIONS ON AERIAL INSPECTION" WITH PHRASE "GIVES AN EARLY VIEW ON INTER ALIA, RESTRICTIONS ON AIRBORNE INSPECTORS". (SHAPE)
- B. PARA 6(B): DELETE SECOND SENTENCE (FRG)
- C. PARA 6(B)(1): CHANGE ASSHOWN IN TEXT BELOW (UK)
- D. PARA 6(B): AT END OF SENTENCE FOLLOWING SUBPARA (3) ADD AFTER WORDS "IN VERIFICATION" WORDS "OR ANY OTHER MEANS OF MONITORING". IN LAST SENTENCE INSERT WORD "ALONE" AFTER WORDS "ON AERIAL INSPECTION" AND BEFORE WORDS "FOR DIRECT".
- E. PARA 9: ADD SUBPARA (J) (SHAPE)
- F. PARA 12 A: UK AMENDMENT (REF B) WAS REVISED AS SHOWN IN TEXT BELOW BY SHAPE AND NETHERLANDS.
- G. PARA 12B: DELETE IN FIRST SENTENCE OF UK AMENDMENT (REF B) PHRASE "WHICH IS THE SOLUTION RECOMMENDED IN THE PREVIOUS ACCEPTABILITY STUDY (ANNEX B)/. (SHAPE)
- H. PARA 12C: CHANGE FIRST SENTENCE OF UK AMENDMENT (REF B) AS SHOWN IN TEXT BELOW. (NETHERLANDS)
- I. PARA 14: INSERT BETWEEN SECOND AND THIRD SENTENCE NEW SENTENCE "FROM THE POINT OF VIEW" ETC. (SHAPE)

MBFR NEGOTIATED INSPECTION - AERIAL INSPECTION

BACKGROUND

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1. THE SPC ON 14TH JANUARY, 1974 ASKED (A/119-R(74)4) THE MBFR WORKING GROUP TO STUDY FURTHER THE MATTER OF MANNED AIRBORNE INSPECTION.

2. AERIAL INSPECTION HAS ALREADY BEEN CONSIDERED IN PREVIOUS STUDIES. THESE INCLUDE:

A. REPORT OF THE VERIFICATION SUB-GROUP (AC/276-WP(70)35(REVISED)) WHICH STATES THAT AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE COULD BE A VALUABLE ADJUNCT TO OTHER METHODS (OF VERIFICATION);

B. US REPORT ON VERIFICATION (US NATO(POL)/OUT/NS73-121)

OF 5TH OCTOBER, 1973. A SUMMARY OF THE SECTION DEALING WITH AERIAL INSPECTION IS AT ANNEX A TO THIS PAPER. THIS US REPORT GIVES THE MOST TECHNICAL INFORMATION ON THIS SUBJECT;

C. THE ACCEPTABILITY OF INSPECTION TO NATO STUDY(1) WHICH GIVES AN EARLY VIEW ON, INTER ALIA, RESTRICTIONS ON AIRBORNE INSPECTORS. AN EXTRACT FROM THE PAPER IS AT ANNEX B;

D. SHAPE STUDY ON AIRBORNE PHOTOGRAPHY(2). A COPY OF THIS PAPER IS AT ANNEX C.

3. THE MBFR WORKING GROUP HAS ALREADY STATED(3) THAT A MEASURE OF AERIAL INSPECTION WOULD ASSIST GROUND VERIFICATION AND THIS POINT HAS BEEN TAKEN UP BY THE SPC(4).

-
- (1) AC/276-D(72)1
(2) SHAPE 1000.1/20-5-4/73
(3) AC/276-D(74)1
(4) ISD/61(5TH REVISE)
-

4.
A. THE WORKING GROUP CONSIDERS THAT THE MORE DETAILED PROBLEMS OF AERIAL INSPECTION CAN ONLY FINALLY BE ASSESSED WHEN CONCRETE REDUCTION AGREEMENTS HAVE BEEN
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CONCLUDED. IN THIS RESPECT THE OBSERVATIONS OF THE WORKING GROUP MUST ALSO BE SUBJECT TO THEIR POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY. HOWEVER, THE WORKING GROUP BELIEVES THAT IT IS POSSIBLE, DRAWING FROM THE MATERIAL ALREADY AVAILABLE, TO REACH A NUMBER OF CONCLUSIONS FROM WHICH THE NECESSARY MILITARY AND TECHNICAL ADVICE FOR THE SPC CAN BE DRAFTED.

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B. THE AIM OF THE PAPER IS THEREFORE TO ADVISE THE SPC:

(1) AS TO WHAT EXTENT AERIAL INSPECTION WOULD BE A
USEFUL ADJUNCT TO OTHER MEANS OF VERIFICATION, IN
PARTICULAR TO A GROUND SYSTEM WHICH ITSELF WOULD
BE A SUPPLEMENT TO NATIONAL MEANS;

(2) AS TO WHAT IS THE BEST METHOD OF AIRBORNE
INSPECTION TECHNICALLY AND MILITARILY.

VALUE OF AIR PHOTOGRAPHY

5. FROM THE MATERIAL AVAILABLE TO THE WORKING GROUP THE
FOLLOWING CHARACTERISTICS OF AIR PHOTOGRAPH CAN BE DEDUCED:

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A. AIR PHOTOGRAPH COULD:

(1) PROVIDE BOTH COVERAGE OF LARGE AREAS AND HIGH
DEFINITION PHOTOGRAPHS OF PIN-POINT TARGETS;

(2) IDENTIFY MAJOR EQUIPMENTS, SUCH AS TANKS AND
AIRCRAFT WITH CONSIDERABLE ACCURACY, IF THEY ARE
NOT EFFECTIVELY CAMOUFLAGED OR CONCEALED;

(3) IF INFRA-RED IS USED, SOMETIMES DETECT SUB-SURFACE
INFORMATION AND INDICATE THE USE OF BUILDINGS
BECAUSE SOME TYPES OF CAMOUFLAGE ARE VULNERABLE
TO INFRA-RED AND ITS FALSE COLOUR DERIVATIVE;

(4) PROVIDE INFORMATION, ON THE TYPE AND APPROXIMATE
SIZE OF UNITS OCCUPYING BARRACKS OR ON THE MOVE,
WITH REASONABLE ACCURACY;

(5) PROVIDE EVIDENCE OF LARGE-SCALE MILITARY
MOVEMENTS AND CONCENTRATIONS;

(6) PROVIDE USEFUL NEGATIVE INFORMATION ON LACK OF
MILITARY ACTIVITY.

B. LIMITATIONS AFFECTING AIR PHOTOGRAPHY INCLUDE:

(1) WEATHER, WHICH CAN TO SOME EXTENT BE OVERCOME BY INFRA-RED EQUIPMENT, ALTHOUGH THIS IS SEVERELY DEGRADED BY CONDITIONS MORE ADVERSE THAN LIGHT MIST: TO PENETRATE THICK CLOUD RADAR WOULD BE REQUIRED. NORMALLY WEATHER CONDITIONS (CLEAR SKY) ARE BETTER OVER THE EASTERN PART OF THE NGA THAN OVER THE WESTERN PART AND THEREFORE FAVOUR AERIAL INSPECTION BY THE ALLIES. NONETHELESS WEATHER CONDITIONS COULD BE A SERIOUSLY RESTRICTING FACTOR ON AERIAL INSPECTION AND ARRANGEMENTS WOULD NEED TO BE MADE FOR PLANNED FLIGHTS, WHICH HAD TO BE ABORTED, TO BE FLOWN AT ANOTHER TIME. WHETHER MUCH USE COULD BE MADE OF ADVERSE WEATHER CONDITIONS TO MOVE TROOPS IN SECRET

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CONTRAVENTION OF AN AGREEMENT IS DOUBTFUL, TOO MUCH RELIANCE WOULD NEED TO BE PLACED ON BAD WEATHER. HOWEVER IT WOULD ALWAYS BE POSSIBLE FOR A VIOLATOR TO ATTEMPT TO AVOID DETECTION BY MOVING FORCES BY NIGHT;

(2) DARNES, WHEN IT WOULD BE NESCESSARY TO USE INFRA-RED OR LOW-LIGHT TELEVISION;

(3) THE SERVICEABILITY OF AIRCRAFT;

(4) IN THE MBFR CONTEXT, ACCEPTABILITY PROBLEMS PARTICULARLY IN ANY PHASE I LIMITED TO US/USSR FORCES ALONE;

(5) THE FREQUENCY OF FLIGHTS PERMITTED;

(6) DECEPTION BY THE FORCES INSPECTED;

(7) INABILITY TO INSPECT CERTAIN AREAS WHICH WOULD BE DELCARED RESTRICTED BY THE INSPECTED COUNTRY;

(8) THE NEED INITIALLY TO BUILD UP A COMPREHENSIVE DATA BANK ON THE AREA TO BE COVERED; THIS MIGHT TAKE UP TO SIX MONTHS BEFORE THE SYSTEM WERE FULLY EFFECTIVE.

6.

A. THESE CHARACTERISTICS INDICATE THAT AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY COULD BE USED IN VERIFICATION, SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATIONS EXPRESSED IN SUB-PARAGRAPH 5.B ABOVE AND TO THE ACCEPTANCE BY THE WP OF THE HEIGHT, FREQUENCY, ROUTING AND CLEARANCE PROCEDURES REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT

EFFECTIVE INSPECTION ARRANGEMENTS, FOR:

(1) RAPID CHECKING OVER A WIDE OR SMALL AREA OF INFORMATION PROVIDED BY MOBILE GROUND TEAMS;

(2) BY INSPECTING WIDE AREAS HELP TO DIRECT MOBILE GROUND TEAMS TO SUSPECT AREAS;

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(3) PROVIDE PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE OF POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS WHICH WOULD NOT BE USABLE IF OBTAINED BY NATIONAL MEANS;

(4) BY ITS MERE EXISTENCE ACT BOTH AS A DETERRENT TO VIOLATIONS AND AS EVIDENCE OF GOOD FAITH.

B. IT HAS BEEN SUGGESTED THAT AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INSPECTION MIGHT BE USED, IN CONJUNCTION WITH A SYSTEM OF GROUND INSPECTION AT NOMINATED BORDER CROSSING POINTS, TO VERIFY THAT FORCES DID NOT ENTER THE NGA AT OTHER THAN THESE NOMINATED POINTS AND DID NOT OTHERWISE CONTRAVENE AN AGREEMENT WITHIN THE NGA. THE WORKING GROUP HAVE CONSISTENTLY TAKEN THE VIEW THAT, BECAUSE OF:

(1) THE LIMITATIONS DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 5.B ABOVE;

(2) THE VULNERABILITY OF THIS SYSTEM TO FRUSTRATION BY THE OTHER SIDE;

(3) THE NEED FOR PRECISE, PREFERABLY EYE-WITNESS, IDENTIFICATION AND/OR CONFIRMATION OF VIOLATIONS AS A BASIS OF EVIDENCE;

ANY AERIAL INSPECTION SYSTEM, OR OTHER MEANS OF MONITORING, MUST BE REGARDED AS AN ADJUNCT TO GROUND INSPECTION IN VERIFICATION. IF STATIC INSPECTION POSTS AT BORDERS WERE THE ONLY ACHIEVABLE FORM OF OVERT GROUND INSPECTION, THERE COULD BE SOME GAIN IN GENERAL INTELLIGENCE THROUGH AS AERIAL INSPECTION SYSTEM OPERATING TO COVER OTHER AREAS. RELIANCE COULD NOT BE PLACED ON AERIAL INSPECTION ALONE FOR DIRECT VERIFICATION OF VIOLATIONS (E.G. AT NIGHT) COULD GO UNDETECTED BY SUCH AERIAL INSPECTION.

TYPES OF SENSORS

7.

A. VARIOUS ELECTRONIC MEANS OF INSPECTION, SUCH AS INFRARED PHOTOGRAPHY, RADAR AND SIDE-LOOKING RADAR, ARE

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AVAILABLE AS WELL AS NORMAL VISUAL AND PHOTOGRAPHIC INSPECTION.

B. RADAR COULD BE USED FOR INSPECTION THROUGH CLOUD BUT THE RESULTING PICTURE WOULD NOT HAVE THE HIGH DEFINITION POSSIBLE WITH AIR PHOTOGRAPHY UNDER GOOD WEATHER CONDITIONS.

C. EARLIER PAPERS (E.G. THE ACCEPTABILITY PAPER) CONSIDERED LOW ALTITUDE VISUAL INSPECTION FROM SLOW MOVING AIRCRAFT. THIS IS CONSIDERED VERY MUCH A SECOND BEST TO MEDIUM LEVEL AIRBORNE PHOTOGRAPHY AND WOULD BE AN INTRUSIVE FORM OF INSPECTION.

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D. A FURTHER POSSIBILITY IS A LARGE CARGO HELICOPTER, FITTED OUT FOR PHOTOGRAPHY SIMILARLY TO THE TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT DISCUSSED IN PARGRAPH 9. IT WOULD BE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE GROUND INSPECTION SYSTEM, ADVERSARY FLOWN AND OPERATING AS AN "AIRBORNE MOBILE TEAM" C COMPLETE WITH HOST OBSERVERS.

THE FACTORS OF SECURITY PARTICIPATION AND FLIGHT PLANNING WOULD APPLY. HOWEVER FLIGHTS WOULD NEED TO BE AS FREQUENT AS THE INSPECTORS REQUIRED. THIS TYPE OF INSPECTION WOULD ALSO BE INTRUSIVE.

3. IF ADVERSARY AIRCRAFT WERE USED FOR MEDIUM LEVEL AIR PHOTOGRAPHY, THEN TECHNICALLY SENSORS WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO BE LIMITED TO AERIAL CAMERAS AND INFRA-RED. ALTHOUGH THIS KIND OF INSPECTION
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MIGHT PRODUCE NO MORE INFORMATION THAN IS OBTAINABLE FROM SATELLITES, IT WOULD NORMALLY PRODUCE IT MORE QUICKLY AND READILY AND WOULD THEREFORE BE A MORE EFFECTIVE CHECK ON ACTIVITIES WHICH WERE SUSPECT. THE PHOTOGRAPHS COULD ALSO BE USED TO CHALLENGE THE OTHER SIDE WHICH WOULD NOT BE THE CASE WITH SATELLITE PRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHS.

8. THIS PAPER CONCENTRATES PARTICULARLY, THEREFORE, ON MEDIUM LEVEL AIRBORNE PHOTOGRAPHY. HOWEVER IT IS POINTED OUT THAT THE CONSIDERATIONS ON PROVISION OF AIRCRAFT CREWS, INSPECTORS AND OBSERVERS ARE VERY SIMILAR WHETHER IT BE FOR NORMAL PHOTOGRAPHY, INFRA-RED OR RADAR.

AIRCRAFT, CREWS AND CONTROL

9.

A. A LOW PERFORMANCE AIRCRAFT E.G. PROPELLER DRIVE, WITH A LONG FLIGHT TIME, OPERATING AT MEDIUM ALTITUDE (E.E. 4,000 TO 10,000 FT) COULD BE USED TO CARRY OUT AERIAL INSPECTION IF THE BASIC METHOD WERE NORMAL AIR PHOTOGRAPHY. THE ACTUAL HEIGHT BRACKET TO BE NEGOTIATED WOULD DEPEND UPON A BALANCE OF SUCH FACTORS AS EFFICIENCY OF OPERATION, FLIGHT SAFETY AND ACCEPTABILITY.

B. THE AIRCRAFT WOULD NEED SUFFICIENT CAPACITY AND POWER SUPPLY FOR THE REQUIRED SENSORS. IT WOULD ALSO NEED TO BE LARGE ENOUGH TO HOLD THE INSPECTORS AND HOST REPRESENTATIVES. IT WOULD BE UNNECESSARY AND COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE TO HAVE ANYTHING THAT MIGHT BE MISTAKEN FOR A COMBAT AIRCRAFT. FOR THESE REASONS AN AIRCRAFT OF THE C130 HERCULES TYPE WOULD BE MOST SUITABLE.

C. SUCH AIRCRAFT ARE AVAILABLE WITHIN THE RESOURCES OF SOME OF THE ALLIES AND ONLY ONE AIRCRAFT, WITH A SECOND FOR BACK-UP PURPOSES, WOULD BE REQUIRED(1).

D. IN ORDER TO ALLOW FULL ALLIED PARTICIPATION IN AERIAL INSPECTION A SYSTEM OF MIXED CREWS FROM INTERESTED COUNTRIES IS TECHNICALLY QUITE FEASIBLE.

E. CO-ORDINATION OF AERIAL INSPECTION WOULD NEED TO BE BY THE SAME NATO BODY TASKED WITH THE CONTROL OF THE OVERALL VERIFICATION
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AND INSPECTION SYSTEM.

F. THE SAME NATO BODY COULD CARRY OUT THE TASK OF ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF THE INFORMATION OBTAINED. THERE WOULD NOT BE A PROBLEM SUCH AS THAT RAISED BY THE USE OF NATIONALLY OBTAINED INFORMATION.

G. IF AIRCRAFT, CREWS, PHOTOGRAPHIC PROCESSING AND INTERPRETATION WERE BASED ON EXISTING UNITS AND FACILITIES IT IS THOUGHT THAT, ONCE THE NECESSARY AIRCRAFT WERE FITTED OUT, THE RUNNING COST WOULD NOT BE TOO HIGH.

H. A SYSTEM OPERATING BELOW 10,000 FT SHOULD NOT HAVE ANY SIGNIFICANT DIFFICULTIES WITH CRITICAL AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL.

J. IF ADVERSARY AIRCRAFT WERE TO BE USED, HOST OBSERVERS WOULD BE NECESSARY.

INSPECTION OPTIONS

10. THROUGHOUT THE REMAINDER OF THIS PAPER THE TERMS "HOST" AND "ADVERSARY" RECUR. IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS PAPER THESE WORDS ARE DEFINED AS FOLLOWS:

A. "HOST". THIS MEANS THE COUNTRY AND/OR FORCES BEING INSPECTED.

B. "ADVERSARY". THIS MEANS THE COUNTRY AND/OR FORCES CARRYING OUT THE INSPECTION.

(1) NOTE: ONE AIRCRAFT AND A BACK-UP ARE MENTIONED AS ADEQUATE IN THE CONTENT OF AERIAL INSPECTION BEING AN ADJUNCT TO A GROUND INSPECTION SYSTEM. IF IT WERE THOUGHT THAT AERIAL INSPECTION ON ITS OWN SHOULD BE EMPLOYED, AND THIS IS NOT ADVOCATED, A MUCH LARGER NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT WOULD BE REQUIRED. A CALCULATION, BASED ON THE FIGURES AND FORMULA IN APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A TO AC/276-WP(74)5(3RD REVISE) -AGV(74)34-USED FOR CALCULATING GROUND TEAMS, PRODUCES A REQUIREMENT FOR 10 TO 14. AIRCRAFT. THIS WOULD ALSO NECESSITATE STRONG BACK-UP INCLUDING SOME 30 EXPERIENCED PHOTO INTERPRETERS.

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1. A. OPTION 1

(1) AIRCRAFT -HOST
CREW -HOST
EQUIPMENT -HOST
INSPECTOR(S) - ADVERSARY

2. SYSTEM. THE INSPECTOR(S REQUEST(S) AIR CRAFT AT STATED TIME FOR STATED ROUTE WITH STATED SENSORS, THE HOST COUNTRY PROVIDES AS REQUESTED AND GIVES THE INSPECTOR UNPROCESSED FILM ON LANDING.

(3) PROBLEMS

(A) WHAT SENSORS SHOULD BE USED AND THEIR SECURITY SENSITIVITY.

(B) POSSIBLE FRICTION IF FLIGHT CANNOT BE FLOWN AT TIMES REQUESTED.

(C) ENSURING CREW FOLLOW DESIRED FLIGHT PATH.

(D) EXPERIENCE IN PEACEDEEPING OPERATIONS HAS SHOWN THAT THE USE OF HOST COUNTRY TRANSPORT OR EQUIPMENT IS MOST UNSATISFACTORY AS IT OFFERS INFINITE POTENTIAL FOR INTERFERENCE. IF, HOWEVER, HOST COUNTRY AIRCRAFT AND EQUIPMENT WERE USED, THE SYSTEM WOULD HAVE TO BE DESIGNED SO THAT INSPECTORS WOULD HAVE ABSOLUTE CONTROL OVER THE FILM. FAILURE TO ENSURE SUCH CONTROL WOULD ENABLE THE HOST COUNTRY TO INTERFERE WITH AND EVEN SUBSTITUTE FILM.

B. OPTION 2

(1) AIRCRAFT HOST
CREW -HOST
EQUIPMENT -ADVERSARY
INSPECTOR(S) - ADVERSARY

(2) SYSTEM. THE INSPECTOR(S) REQUEST (S) AIRCRAFT AT STATED TIME FOR STATED ROUTE AND FIT(S) OWN SENSORS PRIOR TO FLIGHT.

(3) PROBLEMS

(A) ADAPTATION OF AIRCRAFT TO SENSORS. WHILST THE TECHNICAL
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PROBLEMS OF ADAPTING SENSORS TO AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF SOLUTION, THE PROBLEM OF THE SECURITY SENSITIVITY OF THE EQUIPMENT REMAINS.

(B) POSSIBLE FRICTION IF FLIGHT CANNOT BE FLOWN AT TIMES REQUESTED.

(C) ENSURING CREW FOLLOW DESIRED FLIGHT PATH.

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C. OPTION 3

(1) AIRCRAFT -ADVERSARY
CREW -ADVERSARY
EQUIPMENT -ADVERSARY
INSPECTOR() - ADVERSARY
OBSERVER(S) - HOST

(2) SYSTEM. THE INSPECTOR(S) DECLARE(S) INTENTION OF FLYING
STATING MISSION, INVITE(S) OBSERVER(S) AND OBTAIN(S) CLEARANCE.

(3) PROBLEMS

(A) CHECKING BY OBSERVER(S) THAT ONLY AUTHORIZED SENSORS
ARE USED.

(B) ENSURING AIRCRAFTFOLLOWS PATH SUBMITTED.

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12.

A. ADVERSARY INSPECTION (TNT IS PREFERRED BY SHAPE (ANNEX C)
AS TECHNICALLY MORE EFFICIENT AND LESS LIKELY TO CAUSE FRICTION.
THE US PAPER (ANNEX A) STATES THAT HOST AIRCRAFT (OPTIONS 1 AND 2.)
WOULD NOT BE SUITABLE. OPTION 3 IS LIKELY TO BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE
SOLUTION IN THAT THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF ELEMENTS (AIRCRAFT,
SENSORS AND CREW) WOULD BE UNDER THE INSPECTING TEAMS CONTROL.
ALTHOUGH THERE WOULD BE NO PRACTICAL WAY OF ENSURING THAT
A WP INSPECTING TEAM COMPLIED WITH THE FLIGHT PATH LAID DOWN BY
THE NATION(S) WHOSE TERRITORY WAS BEING INSPECTED, ANY DEVIATION
FROM FLIGHT PATHS SENSORS. THIS WOULD TEND TO DISCOURAGE DEVIATION
FROM AGREED FLIGHT PATHS BUT COULD NOT PROVIDE ANY GUARANTEE
AGAINST VIOLATIONS. THE PRESENCE OF HOST OBSERVERS ABOARD
THE INSPECTING AIRCRAFT WOULD ALSO MAKE MORE DIFFICULT THE COVERT
CARRIAGE OF ILLEGAL SENSORS.

B. OPTION 1 WOULD ENSURE THAT THE AIRCRAFT FLEW ONLY ALONG

THE PERMITTED FLIGHT PATH AND CARRIED ONLY THE AUTHORIZED SENSORS.
HOWEVER IT SUFFERS FROM THE DISADVANTAGE THAT CONTRIVED UNSERVICE-
ABILITY
OF THE AVAILABLE AIRCRAFT COULD BE USED TO FRUSTRATE VITAL INSPECTIONS

AND EVEN GENUINE UNSERVICEABILITY COULD PRODUCE A SOURCE OF FRICTION.
IN ADDITION, STEPS WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN TO ENSURE THAT THE FILMS
USED WERE UNDER THE ABSOLUTE CONTROL OF THE INSPECTING TEAM
FROM THE TIME THEY WERE INSERTED INTO THE OPPOSING SIDES'
SENSORS UNTIL THE MISSION WAS COMPLETED. THE INSPECTING TEAM
WOULD ALSO NEED TO DEVELOP ALL FILMS TAKEN. MOREOVER THE INSPECTING
TEAM WOULD HAVE TO BE ALLOWED TO OPERATE THE SENSORS IN FLIGHT,
HAVING TESTED THEM FOR SERVICEABILITY BEFORE TAKE-OFF, IN ORDER
TO PREVENT "ACCIDENTAL" SWITCH-OFFS AT CRUCIAL MOMENTS.

C. OPTION 2 IS A SYSTEM WHICH WOULD MITIGATE SOME OF THE DIFFICULTIES

PRESENTED BY USING THE OTHER SIDES' SENSORS, BUT IT IS LIKELY
TO BE A PRACTICAL SOLUTION ONLY IF SENSOR EQUIPMENTS WERE
LIMITED TO CAMERAS AND INFRA-RED EQUIPMENT. CONTROL OF SENSORS
WITH A LONG RANGE, SUCH AS RADAR, COULD RAISE DIFFICULT PROBLEMS.
HOWEVER, AS FOR OPTION 1, MISSIONS COULD BE THWARTED AT THE LAST
MINUTE BY THE CONTRIVED OR REAL UNSERVICEABILITY OF THE AVAILABLE
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AIRCRAFT.

RESTRICTIONS ON INSPECTION

13.

A. THE RESTRICTIONS OUTLINED IN ANNEX B HAVE ALREADY BEEN AGREED
WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.

B. FOR PRESENT NEGOTIATING PURPOSES THIS OUTLINE OF RESTRICTIONS
IS THOUGHT TO BE ADEQUATE, IT WILL HOWEVER BE NECESSARY IN DUE
COURSE TO DRAW UP DETAILED RULES ON SUCH MATTERS AS:

1. OWNERSHIP OF EQUIPMENT;
2. NUMBER OF INSPECTORS AND TASKS;
3. NUMBER OF LIGHTS;
4. FLIGHT PROGRAMMING AND FLIGHT SAFETY;
5. RESTRICTED AREAS.

NONE OF THESE MATTERS RAISE ANY INSURMOUNTABLE TECHNICAL OR MILITARY
PROBLEMS.

C. ONE TASK OF ANY MONITORING SYSTEM IS TO DETERMINE WHETHER

OR NOR RESIDUAL FORCE CEILINGS HAVE BEEN EXCEEDED. TO DO THIS IN EITHER PHASE I OR II WOULD REQUIRE SURVEILLANCE OF THE ENTIRE NGA, WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF SOME RESTRICTED AREAS OF LIMITED SIZE AND NUMBER.

RECIPROCITY

14. ANY AGREED SYSTEM WILL NECESSARILY BE RECIPROCAL. MILITARY AND TECHNICALLY IT IS CONSIDERED THAT NATO HAS MORE TO GAIN THAN HAS THE WP FROM THE INTELLIGENCE POINT OF VIEW FROM AERIAL INSPECTION. FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF EFFECTIVE MONITORING, MAXIMUM FREEDOM OF AERIAL INSPECTION WOULD BE TO NATO'S NET ADVANTAGE WHATEVER THE SENSORS EMPLOYED. MILITARILY WOULD BE TO THE ULTIMATE ADVANTAGE OF NATO.

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CONCLUSIONS

15.

A. THE WORKING GROUP CONTINUE TO CONSIDER THAT AERIAL INSPECTION MUST BE REGARDED AS AN ADJUNCT TO, AND NOT AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR, A GROUND INSPECTION SYSTEM CONSISTING OF EITHER MOBILE OR STATIC MEANS OF A COMBINATION OF BOTH, AND TO OTHER MEANS OF MONITORING.

B. MILITARILY AND TECHNICALLY:

1. AN AERIAL INSPECTION SYSTEM, WITH MINIMUM RESTRICTIONS, OPERATING AS AN ADJUNCT TO GROUND, PARTICULARLY MOBILE, TEAMS, WOULD BE TO THE ADVANTAGE OF NATO.

(2) (2) MEDIUM LEVEL AIR PHOTOGRAPHY SHOULD BE THE PRINCIPAL METHOD.

(3) WHATEVER THE SYSTEM, THE MORE ELEMENTS THAT ARE UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE COUNTRY (COUNTRIES) BEING INSPECTED, THE MORE OPPORTUNITY THERE WOULD BE FOR A VIOLATOR TO FRUSTRATE THE SYSTEM AT A VITAL TIME.

(4) EACH OF THE SYSTEMS OF AERIAL INSPECTION EXAMINED HAS DIFFERENT ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES FOR EACH SIDE:

(A) A SYSTEM IN WHICH THE AIRCRAFT, SENSORS AND CREW WERE PROVIDED BY THE SIDE CARRYING OUT THE INSPECTION (OPTION 3) WOULD BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE FROM THEIR POINT OF VIEW, BUT ALTHOUGH THE COUNTRY/COUNTRIES TO BE INSPECTED COULD LAY DOWN FLIGHT REGULATIONS FOR THE INSPECTING AIRCRAFT, THERE WOULD BE NO EFFECTIVE WAY OF PREVENTING ADVERSARY AIRCREW FROM DISOBEYING SUCH REGULATIONS EITHER ACCIDENTALLY OR ON PURPOSE;

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SAM-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-07

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SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

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(B) A SYSTEM IN WHICH THE AIRCRAFT, SENSORS AND CREW WERE PROVIDED BY THE NATION(S) BEING INSPECTED (OPTION 1) WOULD ENSURE THAT FLIGHT REGULATIONS WERE OBEYED BUT COULD BE USED TO THWART THE INSPECTING SIDE BY SUCH METHODS AS CONTRIVED OR REAL UNSERVICEABILITY OF AIRCRAFT OR CONTRIVED OR REAL "ACCIDENTS" TO THE SENSORS OR FILMS;

(C) AN INTERMEDIATE SYSTEM IN WHICH THE AIRCRAFT AND CREW WERE PROVIDED BY THE NATION(S) BEING INSPECTED, BUT UNDER WHICH THE SENSORS WERE PROVIDED BY THE INSPECTION TEAM AND WOULD MEET SOME, BUT NOT ALL, OF THE DISADVANTAGES OF THE OTHER TWO OPTIONS AND SHOULD BE A PRACTICAL ANSWER FROM THE TECHNICAL VIEWPOINT

HOWEVER SUCH A SYSTEM COULD STILL BE FRUSTRATED BY THE OTHER SIDE WHICH WOULD CONTROL THE AIRCRAFT USED.

(5) ADVERSARY INSPECTION (OPTION 3), WITH THE HOST PROVIDING OBSERVERS ONLY WOULD BE THE MOST TECHNICALLY EFFICIENT
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SYSTEM.

C. THE POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY OF AERIAL INSPECTION IS OF PRIMARY IMPORTANCE.

D. IF IT IS DECIDED TO NEGOTIATE AERIAL INSPECTION THEN MORE DETAILED STUDIES COULD BE INITIATED TO RESOLVE TECHNICAL QUESTIONS

SUCH AS THOSE POSED IN PARAGRAPH 13.B.

SUMMARY OF DETAILS GIVEN IN PAGES 51-57 OF US NATO (POL/
OUT/NS/73-121

1. PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE-FIELD TEST 15. IN 1968 A TEST WAS CARRIED OUT IN SOUTHERN ENGLAND. SMALL-SCALE, WIDE AREA PHOTOGRAPHY WAS USED FIRST TO LOCATE MILITARY INSTALLATIONS. LARGE-SCALE PHOTOGRAPHS WERE THEN TAKEN OF THESE INSTALLATIONS FOR DETAILED ANALYSIS. FLIGHTS, WEATHER PERMITTING, WERE NORMALLY CARRIED OUT AT ABOVE 40,000 FEET. THIS TEST SHOWED:

(A) AERIAL SURVEILLANCE IS HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON A GOOD DATA BASE;

(B) GOOD RESULTS WERE OBTAINED ON LOCATING BASES AND IDENTIFYING THEIR FUNCTION;

(C) MILITARY UNITS WITH LARGE EQUIPMENTS, E.G. TANKS, WERE MOST EASILY IDENTIFIED;

(D) PHOTOGRAPHIC IDENTIFICATION AVERAGED ABOUT 80 PER CENT; FOR TANK UNITS ERROR WAS AS LITTLE AS 18 PER CENT BUT FOR SOME ARTILLERY UNITS ERROR WAS AS HIGH AS 83 PER CENT.

2. SYSTEMS

(A) SLR (SIDE LOOKING RADAR), HAS GREATER RANGE THAN PHOTOGRAPHY AND IS NOT AFFECTED BY WEATHER BUT IT CAN ONLY IDENTIFY LARGE-SCALE MOVEMENT.

(B) IR (INFRA-RED), HAS HIGHER RESOLUTION THAN SLR AND CAN WORK
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AT NIGHT. HOWEVER, IT IS LIMITED BY WEATHER AND HAS POORER RESOLUTION AND COVERAGE THAN PHOTOGRAPHY.

3. OPERATING FACTORS. THE MAIN DISADVANTAGE OF AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE IS ITS RELIANCE ON FAVOURABLE WEATHER. ITS ADVANTAGES INCLUDE WIDE AREA COVERAGE, QUICK REACTION AND QUICK RETURN OF DATA FOR INTERPRETATION.

4. AIRCRAFT

(A) SPECIALIST AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE TO THE US ARE THE U-2 AND SR-71. BOTH FLY ABOVE NORMAL AIR TRAFFIC. FOR VARIOUS REASONS THE U-2 IS CONSIDERED MORE SUITABLE FOR VERIFICATION PURPOSES.
TWO U-2 WOULD BE REQUIRED.

(B) SPECIALLY EQUIPPED C-130 AIRCRAFT COULD CARRY OUT THE TASK AT 40,000 FEET AND BELOW. TWO AIRCRAFT WOULD BE REQUIRED.

5. OPERATING. THE PAPER SUGGESTS:

(A) THE AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE BASED ON AVAILABLE BASES IN WESTERN EUROPE.

(B) IN THE CASE OF C-130, CREWS COULD BE ALLIED.

(C) TASKING AND ANALYSIS WOULD BE BY AN ALLIED ORGANIZATION. UK AND US COULD PROVIDE EXPERTISE AND ADVICE.

(D) USE OF HOST COUNTRY AIRCRAFT WOULD NOT BE SUITABLE.

6. POSSIBLE OPTIONS. FIVE OPTIONS ARE DISCUSSED:

(A) FLIGHT OF FANCY. THIS WOULD ALLOW FLIGHTS WHERE AND WHEN REQUIRED WITHIN AIR SAFETY LIMITS.

(B) CHALLENGE GAMBIT. THIS ALLOWS AN AGREED NUMBER OF FLIGHTS IN A YEAR BASICALLY AS REQUIRED BUT WITH SOME RESTRICTIONS.

(C) RESTRICTIVE CASE. SIMILAR TO THE CHALLENGE GAMBIT
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(D) MORE RESTRICTIVE CASE. SIMILAR AGAIN BOTH WITH VERY FEW FLIGHTS ALLOWED.

(E) MOST RESTRICTIVE CASE. TOKEN FLIGHTS OVER STRICTLY LIMITED AREAS.

EXTRACT FROM PAGE 4 OF AC/276-D(72)1

RESTRICTIONS ON AIRBORNE INSPECTION, MEDIUM -LEVEL AIR PHOTOGRAPHY AND FLIGHT PROGRAMMING

1. AIRBORNE INSPECTIONS(1) SHOULD ONLY BE ALLOWED IF:

(A) THE AIRCRAFT BELONGS TO THE INSPECTED COUNTRY OR FORCES.

(B) THE FLIGHTS ARE ORIGINATED IN THE INSPECTED COUNTRY.

(C) ADVANCE NOTICE OF THE FLIGHTS IS GIVEN (MINIMUM NOTICE IS 24 HOURS).

(D) THE FLIGHTS ARE CARRIED OUT ONLY ON PRESCRIBED ROUTES AND ALTITUDES.

(E) THE INSPECTORS ARE ESCORTED (BY CREW OF INSPECTED FORCES).

(F) TYPE OF AIRCRAFT, FREQUENCY AND TIMING OF FLIGHTS ARE LIMITED.

2. MEDIUM-LEVEL PHOTOGRAPHY BY AIR COULD BE ACCEPTABLE BUT THERE ARE SUPPLEMENTARY PROBLEMS THAT NEED TO BE RESOLVED, SUCH AS THE OWNERSHIP OF THE AIRCRAFT AND OF THE PHOTOGRAPHIC EQUIPMENT.

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(1) NOTE THE WORKING GROUP HERE WAS CONSIDERING PRINCIPALLY LOWLEVEL VISUAL INSPECTION. MEDIUM-LEVEL AIR PHOTOGRAPHY IS COVERED IN THE SECOND PARAGRAPH.

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE B7010, SHAPE, BELGIUM

1000.1/20-5-4/73

SUBJECT: MBFR VERIFICATION-AIRBORNE PHOTOGRAPHY

REFERENCE: AC/276(SGVE)-WP/3 DATED 24TH JULY, 1972

1. THE PAPER AT REFERENCE ASKS SHAPE TO EXAMINE TWO ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEMS WHICH HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AS REQUIRING CLOSER STUDY AS A PRELIMINARY TO WORK BY A PANEL OF EXPERTS ON THE SUBJECT OF AIRBORNE PHOTOGRAPHIC ARRANGEMENTS WHICH MAY FORM PART

OF A POSSIBLE MUTUALLY AGREED VERIFICATION PROCEDURE OF AN MBFR.
THE TWO ASPECTS ARE:

(A) THE MAINTENANCE OF THE INTEGRITY OF AIR SPACE.

(B) THE PRACTICABILITY OF ROUTING OF THE AIRCRAFT TO ENSURE THAT
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THE RESTRICTED INSTALLATIONS AND AREAS REMAIN PROTECTED.

2. AS A PRELIMINARY TO WORK ON THESE TWO ASPECTS, SHQE HAS
REVIEWED THE PRINCIPLES WHICH IT CONSIDERED IN FORMULATING THE
REPLY TO THE SUB-GROUP(S) QUESTIONNAIRE IN 1971 WITH PARTICULAR
EMPHASIS ON AIRBORNE PHOTOGRAPHIC CONSIDERATIONS ONLY. IN THIS
SHAPE IS ONLY ABLE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT FORCES, FACILITIES AND
INSTALLATIONS WHICH ARE UNDER SACEUR'S PEACETIME CONTROL.

3. IN GENERAL IT IS CONSIDERED THAT ANY RESTRICTIONS SOUGHT
BY ONE SIDE IS LIKELY TO BE RECIPROCATED BY THE OTHER AND THAT
THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE APPROACH THAT CAN BE ACCEPTED MAY WELL
BE TO THE ULTIMATE ADVANTAGE OF NATO. FROM AN INTELLIGENCE POINT
OF VIEW, AN DEQUITABLE INSPECTION SYSTEM MIGHT WELL RESULT IN A
GREATER NET GAIN IN INTELLIGENCE FOR NATO THAN FOR THE WARSAW
PACT.

4. OWNERSHIP OF INSPECTING AIRCRAFT. ON BALANCE THE MOST

SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENT WOULD BE FOR THE INSPECTING PARTY TO USE
ITS OWN AIRCRAFT DURING PHOTOGRAPHIC VERIFICATION FLIGHTS
OVER THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER ALLIANCE. THIS WOULD ELIMINATE
ALL SOURCES OF FRICTION ON ACCOUNT OF TECHNICAL DELAYS DUE TO
SERVICEABILITY OR WEATHER, OPERATION OF EQUIPMENT, PROCESSING
OF PHOTOGRAPHS, ETC. AGAIN ON BALANCE THERE IS LITTLE
MERIT IN ATTEMPTING TO STANDARDIZE ON EQUIPMENT (E.G. CAMERAS,
DEFINITION, ARRAYS AND COVERAGE) WHICH COULD LEAD TO FURTHER FRICTION
AND DISPUTE DURING INSPECTION.

ANNEX C TO AC/276-WP(74)9(3RD REVISE)

5. TYPE OF AIRCRAFT. IT IS NOT CONSIDERED THAT AIR PHOTO-
GRAPHIC FACTORS NEED AFFECT ANY STIPULATIONS AS TO TYPE OF AIRCRAFT.
CONSIDERATION OF OTHER ASPECTS, E.G. SPEED AND HEIGHT FOR RADAR
CONTROL OF INSPECTING FLIGHT AND THE INCLUSION OF AN OBSERVER
FROM THE TERRITORY BEING INSPECTED, MAY MAKE A LOW PERFORMANCE,
PROPELLOR-DRIVEN TYPE OF AIRCRAFT PREFERABLE.

6. LIMITATIONS ON OVERFLYING. AREAS OVER WHICH THE ALLIES
WOULD WISH TO RESTRICT OVERFLYING SHOULD BE KEPT TO A MINIMUM,
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AS FAR AS SHAPE IS CONCERNED THERE ARE NO AREAS OVER WHICH FLYING SHOULD BE PERMANENTLY RESTRICTED. IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO DELINEATE RESTRICTED AREAS ON A TEMPORARY BASIS TO VM COVER SUCH ACTIVITIES AS TACTICAL EXERCISES. HOWEVER, THE DECLARATION OF PERMANENTLY OR TEMPORARILY RESTRICTED AREAS SHOULD BE HELD TO A MINIMUM FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

(A) THE DECLARATION WOULD ADVERTISE THE LOCATION OF SENSITIVE AREAS.

(B) PHOTOGRAPHY IN SUCH AREAS WOULD STILL BE POSSIBLE BY SATELLITE OR CLANDESTINE MEANS.

(C) INEVITABLE, UNDESIRABLE RECIPROCAL RESTRICTIONS WOULD RESULT.

7. ELECTRONIC EMISSION. IT SEEMS POSSIBLE THAT THE GREATEST RISK TO THE INSPECTED NATION'S SECURITY IS IN THE FIELD OF ELECTRONIC EMISSIONS, E.G. ECM/ECCM, RADIO, RADAR. PRE-FLIGHT INSPECTIONS OF A LARGE AIRCRAFT TO PROVIDE POSITIVE ASSURANCE THAT NO APPROPRIATE MONITORING DEVICES WERE BEING CARRIED MAY BE IMPRACTICAL IN AN ACCEPTABLE TIME-SCALE. SUCH MONITORING ACTIVITIES

COULD BE CARRIED OUT WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE INSPECTED NATION'S OBSERVER IN THE AIRCRAFT. IT WOULD THEREFORE SEEM A MORE PRACTICAL APPROACH TO INSIST THAT THE FLIGHT WAS PROPERLY WARNED AND CLEARED, SAY 48 HOURS IN ADVANCE, AND TO ENSURE THAT ALL SENSITIVE ELECTRONIC EMISSIONS WITHIN RANGE OF THE INSPECTING AIRCRAFT WERE STOPPED FOR THE PERIOD OF THE FLIGHT.

8. MAINTENANCE OF INTEGRITY OF AIRSPACE. THE POINT OF ORIGIN OF THE INSPECTING FLIGHT IS OF NO IMPORTANCE. THE FOLLOWING PROVISIONS ARE NECESSARY:

(A) THE FLIGHT MUST BE PROPERLY CLEARED.

(B) THE AIRCRAFT MUST CARRY A HOST NATION'S OBSERVER.

(C) THE FLIGHT MUST BE FLOWN IN A HEIGHT ENVELOPE CHOSEN BY THE INSPECTING NATION.

(D) THE HEIGHT BANK PERMITTED SHOULD BE RESTRICTED ONLY BY CONSIDERATION OF:

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(1) AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL.

(2) AIR SAFETY.

(3) ENSURING RADAR SURVEILLANCE BY THE INSPECTED NATION AS A VERIFICATION THAT THE PLANNED ROUTE WAS IN FACT FLOWN.

9. AIRSPACE OF FRG. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE INTEGRITY OF THE AIRSPACE OF THE FRG IS LEGALLY THE RESPONSIBILITY OF POWERS

UNDER THE FOUR POWER AGREEMENTS FOLLOWING THE 1939-1945 WAR.
IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON AIRBORNE PHOTOGRAPHIC OVER-FLIGHTS IT
WOULD SEEM NECESSARY TO TAKE THIS INTO ACCOUNT INCLUDING THE FRENCH
POSITION SINCE GRENCH FORCES ARE STATIONED IN THE FRG UNDER
BILITERAL ARRANGEMENTS.

10. PRACTICABILITY OF ROUTING TO PROTECT RESTRICTED INSTALLATIONS
AND AREAS. AS INDICATED AT PARAGRAPH 6 ABOVE THERE ARE NO
INSTALLATIONS OR AREAS OVER WHICH SHAPE WOULD WISH PERMANENTLY
TO RESTRICT FLYING. HOWEVER, IT WOULD SEEM FROM NATIONAL
REPLIES TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE IN 1971 THAT SOME NATIONS WITHIN
THE GUIDELINES AREA HAVE AREAS WHICH ARE NATIONALLY SENSITIVE.
AN ANALYSIS WOULD NEED TO BE MADE, WHEN THESE AREAS ARE SPECIFIED,
AS TO THE PRACTICABILITY OF ROUTING AIRCRAFT TO PROTECT THESE
AREAS.
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